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Information security devices must preserve security properties even in the
presence of faults. This in turn requires a rigorous evaluation of the system
behaviours resulting from component failures, especially how such failures affect
information flow. We introduce a compositional method of static analysis
for fail-secure behaviour. Our method uses reachability matrices to identify
potentially undesirable information flows based on the fault modes of the system’s
components.
1. INTRODUCTION
The internationally standardised Common Criteria
for Information Security Evaluation [1] includes ‘fail
secure’ requirement FPT FLS.1, recommending that
the target of evaluation does not violate its security
policy in the event of failures. Unfortunately, the
corresponding Common Methodology for Information
Technology Security Evaluation [2] provides little
guidance on how the requirement is to be demonstrated
or evaluated.
Indeed, evaluating the fault behaviour of a device is
extremely challenging. Not only must the consequences
of every possible failure of every component within the
device be examined, but consideration must be given
to the consequences of simultaneous complicit faults,
involving several components. Furthermore, component
faults may be independent, as per the failure modes of
specific pieces of equipment, or related, due to some
overall design flaw.
In this paper we show how information-flow analysis
can be used to isolate those fault modes that require
close evaluation. This is done by representing input-
output dependencies in a tabular format, where each
cell can hold several different fault modes, and by then
using these tables to calculate end-to-end information
flow in different modes. Both top-down and bottom-up
analyses are supported by allowing for system-wide and
individual-component failures, respectively.
2. PREVIOUS WORK
Our research takes a graph-theoretic approach to
evaluating failure modes. The connectivity of
components within a device is represented as a table
on which reachability analysis is performed to detect
undesirable information flow. This builds on well-
established techniques for analysing information flow
through computer programs [3]. However, unlike our
work, previous ‘information flow relations’ do not take
system modes or states into account.
Earlier research into formal evaluation of security
devices also used graphs and tables to model the
dependencies between ‘monitored variables’ (inputs)
and ‘controlled variables’ (outputs) [4]. Such graphs
were used to assess the ‘complexity’ of a design and
to look for circular dependencies. However, unlike our
work, these graphs have not been used to evaluate
system faults.
Our method is specifically focussed at identifying
violations of confidentiality, that is, illicit flow of
information through a system. This is distinguished
from previous information-flow techniques [3], which
focus on integrity, that is, the correctness of a program.
3. FAULT-MODE DEPENDENCY TABLES
In this section we define our fault-mode dependency
tables and their compositional behaviour. We firstly
introduce the concept for a system with just one mode,
then extend it for system-wide, related failures and then
for local, independent component failures.
3.1. Modelling Information Flow
The information-flow behaviour of a system component
can be considered as a transfer function in which the
component’s outputs depend on the values of its inputs.
This function may vary according to the component’s
state or mode. For a component with multiple inputs
and outputs, the value of each output may depend on
a subset of the inputs only.
As a running example, consider the schematic layout
shown in Figure 1. Component X has inputs A and B,
and output C. Component Y has inputs C and D,
and outputs E and F . In considering the combined
behaviour of these two components we say that the
overall system has inputs A, B andD, outputs E and F ,
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FIGURE 1. Example component layout
and an internal connection C. We assume that each
‘connection’ is an arc with two endpoints; ‘forking’ or
‘joining’ must be modelled with an explicit component
at the point of intersection, rather than by having a
branching connection.
When evaluating the security of such a system we
are concerned with connectivity from inputs to outputs,
especially when the input resides on the high-security
side of the device’s environment and the output on the
low-security side. However, merely treating Figure 1
as a graph and performing reachability analysis is
unhelpful; this would tell us only that both outputs E
and F may depend on any or all inputs A, B and D.
Instead we need to reduce the number of cases to be
evaluated by considering the specific ways in which
components X and Y connect their inputs to their
outputs. Furthermore, the task is made harder by
the fact that these components may establish different
connections in different modes. Therefore, our goal is to
undertake a form of reachability analysis that takes into
account the mode-specific way that components make
connections.
Information-flow analysis for high-level language
software has shown how dependencies among variables
in a program can be calculated using simple matrix
manipulations [3, §10.3]. We adopt this principle as the
basis for our fault-mode dependency tables for analysis
of security device schematics by extending the basic
concept with a notion of fault modes.
3.2. Composing Information Flow
As an introductory exercise, we begin by explaining how
to combine the dependency tables associated with two
components, assuming that there is just one system
mode. In this situation binary tables are sufficient.
The approach builds on concepts for information-
flow analysis between program variables in high-level
language software [3, §10.3]. However, where software
analysis assumes that all variables act as both inputs
and outputs, here we maintain the distinction between
inputs, outputs and internal connections.
The first step is to identify the input-output
relationships for each component, based on the
X C
A 1
B 0
FIGURE 2. Binary dependency table for component X
Y E F
C 1 0
D 1 1
FIGURE 3. Binary dependency table for component Y
information available to the security evaluator, e.g., via
the manufacturer’s data sheet for the component. To
analyse this information it is then encoded in the form
of dependency tables. The general form of such a table
is as follows:
component outputs
inputs
For the given component, the table’s rows list its
inputs and the columns list its outputs. The contents of
each cell determine whether or not a particular output
is dependent on the corresponding input. (In program
analysis [3], effort is required to determine whether a
software variable is used as an input, output or both
to a block of code. In our application the role of each
connection is immediately obvious from the schematic
diagram.) In the case where there is only one mode,
the cells can be filled with binary values. Let ‘1’ in a
cell mean that the output depends on the corresponding
input, and ‘0’ mean that the output is independent of
the input.
As an example, a possible dependency table for
component X in Figure 1 is shown in Figure 2. It
tells us that component X’s output C depends on its
input A, but not on unused input B. Similarly, the
table in Figure 3 models the fact that component Y ’s
output E depends on both of its inputs, but output F
depends on input D only.
Our goal now is to combine these two tables to
produce the dependency relationships for the whole
system. It has been shown elsewhere that matrix
mutiplication provides a satisfactory way of composing
information flows [3, §10.3]. However, recall that to
multiply two matrices the number of columns in the
left-hand matrix must equal the number of rows in the
right-hand one. Therefore, we must first ‘fill in’ the
(human-friendly) dependency tables in Figures 2 and 3
to produce equivalent (machine-manipulable) matrices.
We do this by adding rows and columns for every
connection in the system, so that the rows and columns
both list all inputs, outputs and internal connections.
(In effect, the tables above are sparse matrices which
we need to complete.) The new cells thus created are
filled in as follows:
3X A B C D E F
A 1 0 1 0 0 0
B 0 1 0 0 0 0
C 0 0 1 0 0 0
D 0 0 0 1 0 0
E 0 0 0 0 1 0
F 0 0 0 0 0 1
FIGURE 4. Binary matrix for component X
Y A B C D E F
A 1 0 0 0 0 0
B 0 1 0 0 0 0
C 0 0 1 0 1 0
D 0 0 0 1 1 1
E 0 0 0 0 1 0
F 0 0 0 0 0 1
FIGURE 5. Binary matrix for component Y
• cells on the diagonal of the matrix are filled
with ‘1’, because every connection ‘depends on’
itself; and
• all other newly created cells are filled with ‘0’, be-
cause we don’t want to introduce any dependencies
not identified by the security evaluator.
Thus, the two dependency tables in Figures 2 and 3 can
be transformed into the matrices of Figures 4 and 5.
Each of these matrices models the connections
through a single component. A matrix modelling the
set of all single-component connections can then be
found by ‘adding’ the two matrices. For two binary
matrices X and Y of equal dimensions, let their sum
X+Y be a matrix such that the cell in the ith row and
jth column is defined as follows.
(X + Y )i,j
def= max(Xi,j , Yi,j)
However, the resulting matrix still only defines
dependencies through individual components, i.e., it
shows connections between inputs and outputs that can
be reached in a single step. To tell if we can reach
a given output from a given input by traversing both
components X and Y , we need to take the ‘square’ of
the combined matrix. For a given binary matrix Z, of
dimension N × N , let its square Z2 be a matrix such
that the cell in the ith row and jth column is defined
as follows.
Z2i,j
def= max
16k6N
(Zi,k ∗ Zk,j)
The outer ‘max’ operator iterates over all corresponding
cells k in row i and column j and thus merges all
possible connections between input i and output j. (We
use ‘max’ rather than matrix multiplication’s usual ‘
∑
’
operation so that the outcome remains binary.) The
inner ‘∗’ operator returns ‘1’ only if both cells contain
(X + Y )2 A B C D E F
A 1 0 1 0 1 0
B 0 1 0 0 0 0
C 0 0 1 0 1 0
D 0 0 0 1 1 1
E 0 0 0 0 1 0
F 0 0 0 0 0 1
FIGURE 6. Composition of binary matrices for
components X and Y
(X + Y )2 E F
A 1 0
B 0 0
D 1 1
FIGURE 7. Composition of binary dependency tables for
components X and Y
‘1’, i.e., if input i is connected to internal connection k
and k is connected to output j.
Applying these two operators to the matrices in
Figures 4 and 5 produces the matrix in Figure 6. This
outcome precisely matches our intuitions about the
combined behaviour of these two components. The
diagonal cells show that every connection affects itself,
as before. All the other assumed dependencies, such
as output C’s dependency on input A and output F ’s
dependency on input D, are transferred from the
individual components. Most importantly, however, the
combined matrix reveals that output E may depend
on input A. This is because output E depends on
connection C, according to component Y ’s dependency
table, and connection C depends on input A, according
to component X’s dependency table.
Finally, the combined binary matrix can be turned
back into a more readable dependency table for the
overall system by:
• deleting rows labelled with outputs and internal
connections; and
• deleting columns labelled with inputs and internal
connections.
This hides internal connections and eliminates cells that
are usually irrelevant because they map outputs to
inputs, inputs to inputs, or outputs to outputs.
The final dependency table for our complete system
is thus shown in Figure 7. It tells us that, in the overall
system, output E depends on inputs A andD, output F
depends on input D, and no outputs depend on unused
input B, as expected.
Since we have only two components in this example,
squaring the matrix was sufficient. More generally,
though, there are three possible ways of deciding how
many times to multiply the matrices, in order to ensure
that all transitive relationships from inputs to outputs
are calculated.
4• The most obvious approach is to just keep
multiplying until the matrix stops changing (which
it will, even if there are loops in the graph,
because the dependencies are a static property of
the graph).
• A simpler, but sub-optimal, approach is to multiply
as many times as there are connections in the graph
(which is guaranteed to complete the calculation
for the longest possible path, i.e., when the graph
is linear).
• An approach that is optimal in terms of the number
of multiplications is to multiply as many times as
the length of the longest path through the graph
that doesn’t revisit connections (but this requires a
separate graph analysis to determine this number).
The example we have provided in this section shows
a simple component layout. However, the technique
generalises readily to more complex layouts, such as
where a single input feeds multiple components, or
where there are multiple connections between the same
components.
3.3. System-Wide Fault Modes
Having seen how dependencies can be calculated for
a system with only one mode, we now consider how
the concept can be extended to handle a system with
several fault modes. In this section we consider ‘system-
wide’ failures since this allows the evaluator to model
situations where faults are related, e.g., due to the close
physical proximity of several components to the same
potential source of damage. This supports a top-down
form of fault analysis.
Consider again the system of Figure 1, and assume
that the security evaluator’s analysis of the device’s
construction has identified the following fault modes:
0: no faults
1: connection D broken
2: component X directly links input B to connec-
tion C
3: connection D broken and input B linked to
connection C
Note that while all fault modes are assumed to be
mutually-exclusive, i.e., the system is always in exactly
one of the four modes above, no such assumption is
made about the faults themselves. Thus, fault mode 3
models the situation where the faults of modes 1 and 2
combine.
To handle different fault modes, we extend the
dependency tables of Section 3.2 so that the cells
hold not binary values, but sets of modes. For
instance, Figures 8 and 9 show the dependency tables
for componentsX and Y , respectively, listing the modes
in which dependencies exist.
X C
A {0, 1, 2, 3}
B {2, 3}
FIGURE 8. Dependency table for component X with
system-wide failures
Y E F
C {0, 1, 2, 3} ∅
D {0, 2} {0, 2}
FIGURE 9. Dependency table for component Y with
system-wide failures
In this case component X’s output C depends on
input A in all modes. However, output C depends on
input B only in the two fault modes where a short
circuit has been created between these connections.
Component Y ’s output E depends on its input C in all
modes. However, outputs E and F depend on input D
only in those modes where input D is not broken.
The dependency tables can then be transformed into
complete matrices as before, except that:
• the diagonal of the matrix contains the set of all
modes; and
• newly created cells are filled with the empty set ∅.
Thus, the full matrices derived from the dependency
tables in Figures 8 and 9 are shown in Figures 10 and 11,
respectively.
In this situation, matrices X and Y are added by
taking the union of the corresponding sets of fault
modes.
(X + Y )i,j
def= Xi,j ∪ Yi,j
The resulting N ×N matrix Z can then be ‘squared’
by taking the intersection of the corresponding sets of
failure modes.
Z2i,j
def=
⋃
16k6N
(Zi,k ∩ Zk,j)
The outer ‘∪’ operator iterates over corresponding
cells k in row i and column j and thus merges all
connections between input i and output j via k. The
inner ‘∩’ operator works on individual sets of fault
modes and models the fact that a connection exists
between input i and output j, via internal connection k,
only if information flows from i to k and from k to j in
the same system-wide fault mode.
Thus the matrices in Figures 10 and 11 can be
combined to produce the one shown in Figure 12.
Redundant rows and columns can then be eliminated
as explained in Section 3.2 to give the final dependency
table shown in Figure 13.
Again, the result matches our intuition for this
system. Output E depends on input A in all modes,
5X A B C D E F
A {0, 1, 2, 3} ∅ {0, 1, 2, 3} ∅ ∅ ∅
B ∅ {0, 1, 2, 3} {2, 3} ∅ ∅ ∅
C ∅ ∅ {0, 1, 2, 3} ∅ ∅ ∅
D ∅ ∅ ∅ {0, 1, 2, 3} ∅ ∅
E ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ {0, 1, 2, 3} ∅
F ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ {0, 1, 2, 3}
FIGURE 10. System-wide fault-mode matrix for component X
Y A B C D E F
A {0, 1, 2, 3} ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
B ∅ {0, 1, 2, 3} ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
C ∅ ∅ {0, 1, 2, 3} ∅ {0, 1, 2, 3} ∅
D ∅ ∅ ∅ {0, 1, 2, 3} {0, 2} {0, 2}
E ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ {0, 1, 2, 3} ∅
F ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ {0, 1, 2, 3}
FIGURE 11. System-wide fault-mode matrix for component Y
(X + Y )2 E F
A {0, 1, 2, 3} ∅
B {2, 3} ∅
D {0, 2} {0, 2}
FIGURE 13. Composition of dependency tables for
components X and Y with system-wide fault modes
X C
A {{0}, {2}}
B {{2}}
FIGURE 14. Dependency table for component X with
local fault modes
and it depends on input D in all modes where D is not
broken. However, output E depends on input B only
when there is a short circuit between B and internal
connection C. Output F depends on input D only, and
then only in modes where D is not broken.
An advantage of using system-wide failure modes
is that it facilitates analysis of fault modes which
encompass more than one component. In the example
above, for instance, the combination of a fault in
one of component Y ’s inputs and an internal fault in
component X was explicitly represented.
3.4. Component Fault Modes
In the previous section we assumed that fault modes
were identified for the overall system because they may
be related. A complementary approach is to identify
fault modes for individual components independently,
e.g., using the components’ data sheets, and then
compose them to produce combined fault modes. This
allows for a bottom-up form of failure analysis.
For instance, again consider the schematic layout of
Y E F
C {{3}, {4}} ∅
D {{3}} {{3}}
FIGURE 15. Dependency table for component Y with
local fault modes
Figure 1, and assume that the evaluator has separately
identified possible failures of componentsX and Y . The
potential fault modes defined for component X are as
follows:
{0}: no faults in component X
{1}: connection A broken
{2}: output C depends on input B as well as input A
Then the dependency table for component X refers to
these three modes only, as shown in Figure 14. In
the case of independent fault modes we use sets to
model the modes in which dependencies exist. (This
is necessary to support later composition.) Thus,
Figure 14 tells us that output C depends on input A
only if A is not broken, whereas C depends on input B
only if component X has a short circuit. Again,
although the fault modes for individual components are
assumed to be mutually-exclusive, i.e., the component is
assumed to always be in exactly one of the modes above,
each mode may model several simultaneous failures
within the component.
Similarly, assume that the fault modes for compo-
nent Y are the following:
{3}: no faults in component Y
{4}: connection D broken
The corresponding dependency table is then shown
in Figure 15. It tells us that output E depends on
6(X + Y )2 A B C D E F
A {0, 1, 2, 3} ∅ {0, 1, 2, 3} ∅ {0, 1, 2, 3} ∅
B ∅ {0, 1, 2, 3} {2, 3} ∅ {2, 3} ∅
C ∅ ∅ {0, 1, 2, 3} ∅ {0, 1, 2, 3} ∅
D ∅ ∅ ∅ {0, 1, 2, 3} {0, 2} {0, 2}
E ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ {0, 1, 2, 3} ∅
F ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ {0, 1, 2, 3}
FIGURE 12. Composition of system-wide fault-mode matrices for components X and Y
input C in all modes, whereas output F never depends
on C. Also, both outputs E and F depend on input D
provided that D is not broken.
As before, we need to turn these tables (sparse
matrices) into complete matrices. In this case the
individual matrices are completed by:
• filling the diagonal cells with the set of all singleton
fault-mode sets for the component; and
• filling all other newly-created cells with the empty
set ∅.
The resulting matrix for component X is shown in
Figure 16, and that for component Y in Figure 17.
Both of these components are atomic, so the cells
of their fault-mode dependency tables were populated
by sets of singleton fault-mode sets. More generally,
however, we must consider how to represent the fault
modes of composite components consisting of two or
more atomic components with independent faults. For
an atomic component Ci, let Fi denote the set of its
possible fault modes. In the example above, FX is
{{0}, {1}, {2}} and FY is {{3}, {4}}. Then the set F
of possible fault modes for a composite component C,
comprising atomic components C1, . . . , Cn, is composed
of sets of atomic faults, one for each atomic component.
F def= {f1 ∪ · · · ∪ fn | f1 ∈ F1 ∧ · · · ∧ fn ∈ Fn}
In the example above, the set of all possible fault modes
for the composition of components X and Y is thus
{{0, 3}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {0, 4}, {1, 4}, {2, 4}}.
To ‘add’ independent fault-mode matrices, we
therefore need to define an addition formula that takes
this composition of individual fault modes into account.
For two componentsX and Y , with possible fault modes
FX and FY , respectively, the cell in the ith row and
jth column of the combined matrix is defined as shown
below.
(X + Y )i,j
def={x ∪ y | x ∈ Xi,j ∧ y ∈ FY }, Yi,j = ∅{x ∪ y | x ∈ FX ∧ y ∈ Yi,j}, Xi,j = ∅{x ∪ y | x ∈ Xi,j ∧ y ∈ Yi,j}, otherwise
There are three cases. In the first case component X
allows information flow from input i to output j
in certain modes, but component Y has no modes
that link i to j. Since the components’ fault modes
are independent, the modes in which the composite
component ‘X + Y ’ connects i to j are thus those
composite modes constructed from component X’s
relevant modes in Xi,j and any possible modes in FY
for component Y . Vice versa for the second case
where component Y connects i to j, but X does not.
The third case handles the cells on the diagonal and
creates the cross product of all fault modes from both
components. (By precluding forking and branching
connections in Section 3.1 we ensured that only one
of two components X and Y can link a given input i
to an output j, provided that X and Y contain no
subcomponents in common. In other words, at least
one cell Xi,j or Yi,j will always be the empty set, for
distinct indices i and j.)
Provided that all matrices obey the compositional
principles described above, then ‘squaring’ matrices
containing well-formed sets of independent fault modes
works in exactly the same way as for system-wide fault
modes.
Z2i,j
def=
⋃
16k6N
(Zi,k ∩ Zk,j)
In this case the inner ‘∩’ operator takes the intersection
of sets of sets of individual faults, and thus models the
fact that information flows from i to j via k when the
two components are both in compatible modes.
In the example, the matrices in Figures 16
and 17 are therefore composed to yield the one
in Figure 18. For brevity, let ‘∗’ denote set
{{0, 3}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {0, 4}, {1, 4}, {2, 4}}.
Irrelevant rows and columns can then be removed as
before, to produce the final composite dependency table
shown in Figure 19. Once more, we have a meaningful
result. The table tells us that output E depends on
input A in any composite mode where there are no
faults in component X, or component X has a short
circuit between input B and output C. By contrast,
output E depends on input B only in modes where the
short circuit exists. Output F never depends on input A
or B. Outputs E and F depend on input D in all modes
where component Y ’s connection to D is not broken.
7X A B C D E F
A {{0}, {1}, {2}} ∅ {{0}, {2}} ∅ ∅ ∅
B ∅ {{0}, {1}, {2}} {{2}} ∅ ∅ ∅
C ∅ ∅ {{0}, {1}, {2}} ∅ ∅ ∅
D ∅ ∅ ∅ {{0}, {1}, {2}} ∅ ∅
E ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ {{0}, {1}, {2}} ∅
F ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ {{0}, {1}, {2}}
FIGURE 16. Local fault-mode matrix for component X
Y A B C D E F
A {{3}, {4}} ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
B ∅ {{3}, {4}} ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
C ∅ ∅ {{3}, {4}} ∅ {{3}, {4}} ∅
D ∅ ∅ ∅ {{3}, {4}} {{3}} {{3}}
E ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ {{3}, {4}} ∅
F ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ {{3}, {4}}
FIGURE 17. Local fault-mode matrix for component Y
4. CASE STUDY: A KEYBOARD SWITCH
As a more substantial case study we consider a
‘Keyboard Switch’, which itself may be part of a Multi-
Computer (or Keyboard-Video-Mouse) Switch. Such
devices are used to allow peripheral equipment to be
shared between computers residing in different security
domains. In this example the Keyboard Switch device
is intended to connect a single keyboard to either of two
computers, depending on the state of a toggle switch.
Figure 20 shows the Keyboard Switch’s schematic
diagram. Its components are the keyboard, a toggle
switching component, and two microprocessors, PIC1
and PIC2. Typically the microprocessors must perform
two major functions. Firstly, they must allow both
computers to complete their boot sequences in the
belief that they each have a dedicated keyboard
attached. Then, in normal operating mode, while
one microprocessor is forwarding keystrokes from the
keyboard to the appropriate computer, the other must
convince the ‘disconnected’ computer that it still has
a keyboard attached. The ‘toggle switcher’ controls
the behaviour of the two microprocessors, depending
on the position of a physical switch controlled by the
operator. (To avoid the computers reacting to having
their keyboard ‘unplugged,’ the switching component
does not actually disconnect and reconnect the physical
lines.)
Although the primary information flow through the
device consists of keystrokes going from the keyboard
to either of the computers, the computers may try
to send signals back to the keyboard to, for instance,
control LEDs that inform the operator of the Caps-
Lock status, etc. For this reason, all of the connections
shown in Figure 20 are potentially bidirectional. (For
simplicity here we also assume that data passes through
the switching component although, as we shall see, such
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FIGURE 20. The Keyboard Switch
a design does not provide a clear separation of security
concerns.) The obvious security issue, therefore, is that
a failure in the Keyboard Switch could allow sensitive
information to flow from one computer to the other.
In this case we will undertake a bottom-up
evaluation, using individual component fault modes.
The toggle switching component has three modes:
8(X + Y )2 A B C D E F
A ∗ ∅ {{0, 3}, {0, 4},
{2, 3}, {2, 4}}
∅ {{0, 3}, {0, 4},
{2, 3}, {2, 4}}
∅
B ∅ ∗ {{2, 3}, {2, 4}} ∅ {{2, 3}, {2, 4}} ∅
C ∅ ∅ ∗ ∅ ∗ ∅
D ∅ ∅ ∅ ∗ {{0, 3}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}} {{0, 3}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}
E ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∗ ∅
F ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∗
FIGURE 18. Composition of local fault-mode matrices for components X and Y
(X + Y )2 E F
A {{0, 3}, {0, 4}, {2, 3}, {2, 4}} ∅
B {{2, 3}, {2, 4}} ∅
D {{0, 3}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}} {{0, 3}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}
FIGURE 19. Composition of dependency tables for components X and Y with local fault modes
PIC1 C E
C {{4}, {5}} {{5}}
E {{4}, {5}} {{4}, {5}}
FIGURE 22. Dependency table for PIC1
{0}: switcher working correctly
{1}: switcher with connections A and B shorted
together
{2}: switcher cross wired, so that A connects to D and
B connects to C
The dependency table for the toggle switcher is shown in
Figure 21. Since all four connections are bidirectional,
they all appear in both the input rows and output
columns. Normally the switch will either connect A
and C, or B and D, as shown by the four occurrences
of ‘fault’ mode {0}, ignoring those on the diagonal. In
fault mode {1}, however, B can additionally depend on
A and vice versa. In fault mode {2}, the switch will
either connect A and D or B and C.
Microprocessor PIC1 is programmed to securely
communicate between the keyboard and computer A,
as directed by the toggle switcher. When A is
the ‘connected’ computer, PIC1 forwards keystrokes
received from connection E to connection C. When
A is ‘disconnected’, PIC1 discards keystrokes received.
In either situation, PIC1 accepts and responds to
signals from computer A to preserve the computer’s
belief that it has a dedicated keyboard attached.
To localise the flow of potentially confidential data,
PIC1 is programmed not to forward information from
computer A to the keyboard. Here, however, we assume
that a failure in PIC1 may allow such information flow
to occur.
{4}: PIC1 working normally
PIC2 D F
D {{6}, {7}} {{6}}
F {{6}, {7}} {{6}, {7}}
FIGURE 23. Dependency table for PIC2
Keyboard E F
E {{8}, {9}} {{9}}
F {{9}} {{8}, {9}}
FIGURE 24. Dependency table for the keyboard
{5}: PIC1 leaking information to keyboard
Figure 22 shows the dependency table for microproces-
sor PIC1. Normally, in mode {4}, it allows information
to flow from E to C only. In fault mode {5}, however,
information can also flow from C to E.
The fault modes for PIC2 are analogous and its
dependency table is shown in Figure 23.
{6}: PIC2 working normally
{7}: PIC2 leaking information to keyboard
The keyboard is configured to simply send each
keystroke along both channels E and F (following
which the ‘connected’ microprocessor will forward them
to the appropriate computer, and the disconnected
microprocessor will ignore them). Since connections E
and F are effectively wired together at the keyboard, we
assume that under certain circumstances it is possible
for signals received on one to be echoed on the other.
{8}: keyboard working securely
{9}: keyboard exchanging information between its
connections
Figure 24 shows the dependency table for the keyboard.
Normally, in mode {8}, neither connection depends on
9Switcher A B C D
A {{0}, {1}, {2}} {{1}} {{0}, {1}} {{2}}
B {{1}} {{0}, {1}, {2}} {{2}} {{0}, {1}}
C {{0}, {1}} {{2}} {{0}, {1}, {2}} ∅
D {{2}} {{0}, {1}} ∅ {{0}, {1}, {2}}
FIGURE 21. Dependency table for toggle switcher
the other, but in fault mode {9} connection E depends
on F and vice versa.
Given these tables it then possible to apply the
procedure described in Section 3.4 to calculate the
dependencies created by composite failure modes. The
tables can be combined two at a time. The order in
which this is done is not significant because the table
composition definitions are associative.
However, undertaking this procedure reveals that
the size of the tables grows dramatically, due to the
large number of composite fault modes generated. The
first composition generates fault modes each containing
two local faults, the second generates fault mode
‘triples’ and so on. Indeed, for a system comprising
x components, each of which has y modes on average,
there are yx distinct global fault modes to consider!
Even the small example described above can produce
up to 3 ∗ 2 ∗ 2 ∗ 2 = 24 distinct fault modes and, since
there are 36 cells in the dependency table, there can be
up to 24 ∗ 36 = 864 fault mode entries.
Thus, the final dependency table for the whole
Keyboard Switch is very complicated. Fortunately,
however, only a few of the cells are of importance.
In particular, we are concerned by those that show
information flow between A and B, because these
reveal modes in which information may flow from one
security domain to the other. For instance, the cell
showing when connection B’s value depends on that of
connection A contains the following set.
{{1, 4, 6, 8}, {1, 4, 7, 8},
{1, 5, 6, 8}, {1, 5, 7, 8},
{1, 4, 6, 9}, {1, 4, 7, 9},
{1, 5, 6, 9}, {1, 5, 7, 9},
{0, 5, 6, 9}, {0, 5, 7, 9},
{2, 4, 6, 9}, {2, 5, 6, 9}}
This tells us that there are twelve fault modes in
which this undesirable information flowmay potentially
occur, according to our model of the Keyboard Switch’s
possible failures. The twelve modes identified can be
partitioned into three distinct groups.
• The first eight modes, from {1, 4, 6, 8} to
{1, 5, 7, 9}, all include component failure 1 in which
the toggle switcher has directly connected A and B.
This outcome reveals that the switching component
is a single point of failure in this design, and ex-
plains why combining switching and data transfer
functions in a single component is considered poor
security design.
• In modes {0, 5, 6, 9} and {0, 5, 7, 9} microprocessor
PIC1 is incorrectly sending data to the keyboard
and the keyboard is incorrectly exchanging data
between its two connections. (The second mode
additionally includes the failure of microprocessor
PIC2.) This outcome tells us that there is a
potential security violation due to the combined
effect of two independent failures in these separate
components.
• The final two modes, {2, 4, 6, 9} and {2, 5, 6, 9},
both include the situation where the toggle
switcher is cross wired and the keyboard is
exchanging data between its connections. The
apparent security violation is that data from
computer A could flow through PIC2 (due to
the cross wiring), through the keyboard (due to
the echoing of signals), through PIC1, and out
to computer B (again via the cross-wired toggle
switcher). However, this result is in fact a ‘false
positive.’ This information-flow scenario would
not occur in practice because only one of the two
microprocessors is ‘connected’ and forwarding data
at any given moment.
Once the final dependency table has been generated
it is up to the security evaluator to interpret the results
appropriately. For instance, the first group of modes
above revealed that the ‘toggle switcher’ is a single
point of failure in the Keyboard Switch device, so the
evaluator would be obliged to use the manufacturer’s
measured failure rates for this component to determine
whether or not this risk is acceptable. Similarly, the
evaluator must decide whether the pair of complicit
failures in the second group is sufficiently likely to
warrant concern. For the third group, the evaluator
needs to explain why this potential data-flow scenario
is not possible in practice. (Generation of this false
positive is not an error in our calculations, but is
a limitation of the particular failure model of the
Keyboard Switch used, which did not fully represent all
of the normal operating states of the microprocessors.)
5. DISCUSSION
Ideally all system components should be treated
uniformly under our methodology, regardless of whether
they are implemented as hardware or software. Thus,
programmable components would be represented as
a composition of a hardware component and a
software component. The hardware component includes
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physical inputs and outputs, as well as logical
variables which can be treated as ‘connections’ to
the software. However, production of a dependency
table for computer software presents a challenge
outside the scope of this paper. Readers are referred
to Barnes [3] for a method of producing mode-
independent dependency tables for software. However,
determining meaningful fault modes for computer
programs is an open problem in the safety-critical
systems literature [5, 6].
As in any type of formal analysis, the results achieved
using our method are only as good as the model on
which they are based. We saw in Section 4 above
that a limitation in our failure model of the Keyboard
Switch led to a number of ‘false positives’ being
produced. Whether it is worthwhile devising a more
comprehensive failure model to eliminate such results,
or whether the false positives can be satisfactorily
explained away, depends on the security evaluator’s
judgement.
Similarly, an interesting aspect of the case study
in Section 4 is that the scenario in which the toggle
switcher suffers fault {2}, and thus connects the wrong
components, is not highlighted as a security problem
in itself, even though it would cause the operator’s
keystrokes to go to the wrong computer. This is
because the failure model used above does not capture
the operator’s intent or the ‘correct’ behaviour of the
overall device. However, we observe that this concern
could be analysed, if desired, by explicitly modelling
the operator’s keystroke data streams, separating them
into those intended for computer A and those intended
for computer B. Our analysis could then be used to
identify fault modes in which keystrokes intended for
computer A are sent along channel B, and vice versa.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Evaluating security devices relies on the ability to
assess the impact of various system failures on
potential information flow. We have presented a
compositional method for calculating the dependencies
between a system’s inputs and outputs in different fault
modes. Both top-down and bottom-up evaluations were
accommodated by considering dependent (global) and
independent (local) fault modes, respectively.
As the examples in this paper show, composition
of local fault modes results in a rapid escalation of
the number of cases to be evaluated. It is for this
reason that bottom-up fault evaluations, while the
most ‘natural’ approach, because they can use well-
established fault metrics for given components, have not
been practical to date.
Fortunately, composition of our fault-mode depen-
dency tables is based on simple matrix manipulations
and is thus readily automatable. We are currently de-
veloping a tool which will generate the combined ta-
bles automatically, and then highlight those worrisome
combinations of faults that connect high-security in-
puts to low-security outputs. Furthermore, the tables
themselves will be generated automatically from a de-
vice’s schematic diagram, since the structure of rows
and columns is isomorphic to the diagram’s connectiv-
ity graph. The security evaluator then merely needs to
populate the tables with appropriate fault modes, which
is a straightforward task, comparable to filling in truth
tables for digital electronic components.
Finally, we note that there are a number of ways
in which this work can be extended. For instance, we
assumed above that the schematic layout of components
was static, and that changes in connectivity were
all due to faults occurring in individual components.
However, we can readily imagine extending the system-
wide analysis to model faults that change the schematic
layout, e.g., to add a short circuit across the
processor board, by adjusting cells in the system-wide
matrices. Another issue when performing failure mode
evaluations in practice is the possibility that certain
security violations may arise from a particular sequence
of failures, separated in time. It remains to be seen how
the analysis above can be extended to handle temporal
concerns.
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